%20SexInSex%21%20Board hsearch Szh v Szh r Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 i1isearchgc Szh nsearchlso Quickwpthemes %20SexInSex%21%20Board n %20SexInSex%21%20Board t %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 e %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 l Szh t %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 r %20SexInSex%21%20Board t Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 r Quickwpthemes searchssearcht %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 a Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 nsearch Quickwpthemes i Quickwpthemes hsearchsasia%20authorship%20seedvoasearchi Quickwpthemes nsearch %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 b %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 tusearcht %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 e %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 tsearchasearchisearchi Quickwpthemes nsearchpEntrepeneur%20WP%20%D6%F7%CC%E2%CF%C2%D4%D8r s Quickwpthemes ,searchbsearchtsearchm1n Szh %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 a Quickwpthemes sexinsex%20%D1%C7%D6%DE%CE%DE%C2%EBb Szh tr %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 csearch searchxsearchr %20SexInSex%21%20Board dti Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 ndpa4u+%BA%C2%C4%CF%DC%E7+rmvbni %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 gsearcho %20SexInSex%21%20Board searchh %20SexInSex%21%20Board pAsia%20Uncensored%20Section%20%7C%20%D1%C7%D6%DE%CE%DE%C2%EB%D7%AA%CC%FB%C7%F8r Szh isearchssearchi %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 vl %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 edsearchand %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 osearchhesearch Szh i %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 csearchms %20SexInSex%21%20Board a %20SexInSex%21%20Board ce Szh . Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 Fsearch7search]Tot %20SexInSex%21%20Board r,bt%D7%CA%D4%B4%B7%D6%CF%ED%B5%DA%D2%BB%D5%BEw Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 isearchh searchs o %20SexInSex%21%20Board tsearchasearchesearch searchndsearchr %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 bo Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 h Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 csearchstsearchmsearchrsearch searchn %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 ern Szh t Quickwpthemes on %20%D1%C7%D6%DE%D0%A1%B8%F1%CA%BD%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8%28%D0%A1%D3%DA500M%29%20 l Szh l %20SexInSex%21%20Board wansearch t %20SexInSex%21%20Board e %D3%C0%BF%B5%D5%E3%C9%CC%B3%B5%D2%B5 C Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 nsearchen Quickwpthemes i Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 n Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 Aga Asia%20Uncensored%20Rips%20 nstTosearchtre, comes closest to being an absolute obstacle to extradition, but even then the “universally binding status of the norm may not exclude differences in interpretation over what constitutes torture.” [FN78] With respect to the death penalty, certainly the fact that a fugitive will be executed if returned to the requesting state cannot itself obstruct extradition, because international law does not prohibit the death penalty. However, some states are so opposed to the use of the death penalty that diplomatic assurances that execution will not take place are necessary (and not even always sufficient) to facilitate extradition. [FN79] Scholars have made arguments that a requesting state’s lack of *188 respect for various other human rights should absolutely obstruct extradition, [FN80] but the reality is that “there is no certainty about the content and scope of the rights that are most likely to block extradition.” [FN81] There is not yet any international law that conclusively overrides bilateral extradition agreements, so whether or not any given human right will obstruct an extradition is solely a matter of bilateral diplomatic negotiations.

III. Divergent Approaches to Extraditions with China

Western nations have long struggled with how to pursue bilateral extradition negotiations with the Chinese in light of their human rights record. China is often described as harboring some of the worst human rights abuses in the world. The U.S. Department of State laments the Chinese government’s record as “poor” and “deteriorated.” [FN82] U.N. bodies are equally critical. [FN83] There have been eleven attempts to censure China before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva since 1990. [FN84] Nongovernmental and watchdog organizations regularly release scorching critiques. [FN85] While some claim that these critiques are unfair and that China is being held to a higher standard than other countries, [FN86] an objective observer must concede that China has yet to halt its most significant human rights abuses.

Until the early 1990s, China had not entered into any extradition treaties with other states. But around this time, as corrupt officials began to flee the country in large numbers, [FN87] the Chinese government focused on increasing its international criminal cooperation. [FN88] In 1993, China signed its first extradition *189 treaty, with Thailand. [FN89] Since 1993, it has ratified more than twenty bilateral treaties, but they have mostly been with developing countries, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, and Russia. [FN90] It has been easier for China to negotiate with these countries, in part because they are all formerly socialist countries, have legal systems similar to that of China, [FN91] and are generally less demanding about human rights issues. Indeed, although China’s extradition treaties with developing countries generally comply with the principle of double criminality, the principle of specialty, and the principle of non-extradition for political offenses, they do not provide other protections for the individual. [FN92] These treaties have benefited China, as developing countries in geographical proximity to China have attracted Chinese fugitives–especially low-level officials who fled with relatively small sums of money. [FN93] From 1993 until 2005, more than 230 Chinese criminal suspects were returned to China. [FN94]

Despite obstacles posed by its human rights record, China has turned its attention to negotiating extradition agreements with developed Western countries. High-level officials wanted for large-scale, corruption-related crimes have fled to developed Western countries at high rates, [FN95] and China is interested in prosecuting these fugitives. [FN96] Sustainable economic growth is a primary focus of the Chinese government, [FN97] and corruption is a serious hindrance to responsible growth. The official Xinhua News Agency quoted sources from the Ministry of Public Security stating that “800 suspects at large abroad [are] wanted for economic crimes. They are accused of embezzling a total sum of almost 70 billion yuan (US$8.75 billion).” [FN98] An earlier government tally estimated that at least four thousand suspected corrupt officials had pocketed US$50 billion and were hiding from law enforcement. [FN99]

The effort to bring corrupt officials to justice has reached the highest levels of Chinese government. In 2000, China promulgated its first national extradition law, “which provides for specific rules, conditions, and procedures for extradition cooperation with other countries.” [FN100] In January 2007, *190 President Hu Jintao called for a “sustained fight against corruption” at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held in Beijing. [FN101] According to Professor Wang Guixiu of the Communist Party of China’s Central Party School, “[t]he intensifying anti-corruption punch reflects the fact that the top administration is coming to an awareness of the crisis and has reached a consensus on combating corruption.” [FN102] Because corruption enables “the well-connected to line their pockets at the expense of the public,” the people of China as well as the government are interested in clamping down on it. [FN103] As one major component of this effort, the government is aggressively seeking to cooperate in transnational criminal law enforcement, especially with developed Western nations. [FN104]

Western nations have taken divergent approaches in responding to Chinese entreaties for formal cooperation. Spain and France have led the way in reaching formal extradition agreements with China, under which they agree to extradite wanted Chinese fugitives to China as long as Beijing makes assurances that it will not execute them. Portugal and Australia also subscribe to this approach. Meanwhile, Canada embodies a virtual non-engagement approach with the Chinese on extradition; its system makes extraditions nearly impossible to realize unless China improves its human rights practices. The United States has chosen a case-by-case approach, earnestly evaluating extradition requests from China and choosing to extradite only when certain conditions are met. The remainder of this Part describes these three approaches in turn, highlighting key differences between them and setting the stage for an analysis of each approach’s relative strengths and weaknesses.

A. Treaty-Based Approach to Extradition with China

There is no obligation under international law to surrender an alleged criminal to a foreign state for prosecution. Nevertheless, many states desire the right to demand the transfer of criminals from other countries, and bilateral extradition treaties create this right. The “treaty-based approach” to extradition with China imposes on both parties relatively inflexible obligations to extradite, subject to whatever conditions are noted in the treaty’s text.

Between 1993, when China entered into its first extradition treaty, and 2005, when China and Spain signed their groundbreaking treaty, it seemed unlikely that China would be able to reach an agreement with a Western developed nation in the near future. “Negotiations with developed countries *191 were moving slowly,” said Xu Hong, counselor in the Chinese Department of Treaty and Law, in April 2006. [FN105] The reason such negotiations were proceeding slowly was Western concerns over Chinese human rights practices, and especially China’s use of the death penalty. China is widely reported to execute more individuals than the rest of the world combined [FN106] and even uses the death penalty as punishment for nonviolent economic crimes. [FN107]

Such widespread use of execution is abhorrent to several Western nations, but it is “a big problem particularly for the Europeans,” according to one commentator. [FN108] The European Union is “opposed to the death penalty in all cases” and has consistently advocated for its universal eradication. [FN109] It even makes abolition of the death penalty a requirement for nations seeking EU membership. [FN110]

Despite these views, European nations have successfully negotiated extradition treaties in the past with nations that impose the death penalty. The most prominent examples are negotiations that have taken place with the United States. A majority of U.S. states and the U.S. federal system employ capital punishment, [FN111] and the United States faces severe criticism from Europe because of this practice. [FN112] Yet, the United States and European nations have found a viable middle ground to facilitate extraditions. The United States has agreed to include assurance language in treaties with European nations. Pursuant to such treaties, the United States, as the requesting state, will promise the requested state that if the fugitive is extradited it will conform to the requested state’s desire that the death penalty not be applied. [FN113] The European state will then extradite pursuant to this assurance. Western European states now regularly demand that all of their bilateral extradition treaties provide for such conditional extradition, and the *192 treaties forbid extradition “where the requesting state retains the death penalty and is unwilling to provide assurances that this penalty will not be implemented if the fugitive is extradited.” [FN114]

The overwhelming size of China’s human rights problems was one major factor distinguishing Europe’s negotiations with China from its negotiations with the United States, however. The death penalty was only the foremost of many human rights concerns that seemed to be impeding China’s ability to reach treaties with European nations. [FN115] Of course, it was also easier for the United States and Western European nations to reach extradition agreements because the parties had established diplomatic ties, intertwined histories, and cultural similarities that Europe does not have with China.

The common perception that China would not be able to enter an extradition treaty with a Western nation was shattered when, on November 14, 2005, Spain and China signed a treaty for conditional extradition, making Spain the first developed Western nation to sign an extradition treaty with China. The treaty stipulated that extraditions from Spain to China would be contingent upon China’s promise not to execute returned fugitives, [FN116] but the treaty contains no other human rights protections. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero signed the treaty in Madrid as only one component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two nations that would “usher in a new phase of development in bilateral relations.” [FN117] The extradition treaty was one of sixteen bilateral agreements that the two leaders signed on the same day. Other agreements included a trade accord, an agreement to cooperate on developing peaceful nuclear energy, an investment treaty, and an agreement on the establishment of cultural centers. [FN118] Both sides expressed hope that their relationship would serve as a model for strengthening the broader China-EU relationship. [FN119]

The signing of the extradition treaty was not lost on public commentators among the flurry of official government announcements, which tended to focus on the economic and trade aspects of the deal. Chinese experts confirmed that their government had legally committed itself not to execute criminal suspects repatriated from Spain. The Chinese media described the “non-extradition for death penalty” provision as a “major shift in tactics” for bringing corrupt officials back to China to face prosecution, [FN120] and they lauded it as indicative of China’s respect for human rights. [FN121] Western *193 observers acknowledged that agreeing not to use the death penalty was a groundbreaking move by the Chinese, as they had never agreed to such a provision before, [FN122] but they questioned nonetheless whether it was appropriate to enter into an extradition agreement with such a frequent violator of human rights. The Spanish branch of Amnesty International severely criticized Spanish leaders for entering into the agreement in light of China’s human rights record. Protests followed in Madrid. [FN123]

A little over a year later, in spite of human rights-based critiques of the Spanish approach, the French government entered into a similar treaty with China. President Hu and French President Jacques Chirac agreed on the treaty in Paris in January 2007, and French Justice Minister Pascal Clement and Chinese First Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo signed the treaty on March 20, 2007. [FN124] Like Spain, France insisted on terms that it will only extradite upon receipt of a guarantee that the Chinese will not employ capital punishment. [FN125] Both countries hailed the agreement as crucial for their bilateral relations and the suppression of safe havens for criminal suspects. [FN126] Chirac also touted benefits for French business as a result of the French government’s engagement with Beijing. [FN127]

A variety of actors in France assailed the treaty. Amnesty International France urged the French legislature not to ratify the text because of human rights concerns. [FN128] In response to the French Justice Ministry’s dismissal of the criticism, Amnesty France stated that there would be “no certainty that a Chinese citizen extradited one day with the clearest guarantees will not be *194 sentenced to death at a later date on a different charge.” [FN129] Socialist French presidential candidate Ségolène Royal joined human rights groups in criticizing the extradition treaty with China. [FN130] Many critics focused on the perception that France was motivated mostly by its economic bottom line in agreeing to the treaty. In a joint statement, the Paris-based League of Human Rights (LDH) and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) asserted: “the commercial interests of France do not justify the slightest leniency towards China.” [FN131] Jean-Pierre Dubois, president of the French Human Rights League, proclaimed that he was “astonished that the French government could agree to deliver anyone up to a legal system that does not guarantee any individual liberty” and that “[i]t is clear that this treaty has been drawn up for economic reasons, which is totally unacceptable.” [FN132]