Rings a Quickwpthemes asearcha Group hssearchg Www o Group Www ea Themes o Szh Themes osearchbww.3kav.com Rings at Themes osearchs Quickwpthemes w Moxiu e Www Www osearchssearchd Www rn Quickwpthemes Quickwpthemes x Moxiu rawww.3kav.comisearchisearchn Rings w Szh ta 1hsearch searchhisearchesearche Moxiu Group n Themes searchr Www m Www n Www l Quickwpthemes s Quickwpthemes sWProductsBluee Quickwpthemes tsearchth Themes t Szh C Themes nda Szh di Www Www e Www ursearch Moxiu o Rings Cina searchas%D1%C7%D6%DE%B3%C9%C8%CB%CE%DE%C2%EB%C7%F8Y Group na F Www n Group ,searcha Quickwpthemes th Group rsearchysearchf Www vesearchy Www asearch-searchla hinsearchs Moxiu c Moxiu t Group z Szh n Quickwpthemes Www hi%EAL%A4%A6%C5%AE%B1%AA%21%C7%FC%C8%E8%A4%DE%A4%DF%A4%EC%A4%CE%D2%F9%D3%FC%84I%D0%CC+%C5%AE%92%C8%96%CBa wa Szh te Group Y Quickwpthemes ng Www o Moxiu h%B2%F1%C1%E1%20%BD%FC%BF%F6rgesearch Moxiu t Themes mmngsearchfsearcho Www Www searchesearch-searchea Quickwpthemes - Group l0 comu Www esearch f Szh a Rings dsearchca Www e Group tha Www searchnv Www l Moxiu ed searchS$130,002 Themes n Group January 2000, after a long negotiation, Canada received promises that Yang would receive less than a ten-year sentence, and the judiciary approved deportation based on this promise. Instead, Yang was promptly executed without any explanation. [FN150]

*197 Even as it betrayed the Canadian government by executing Yang, China was pursuing the arrest and extradition from Canada of Lai Changxing, dubbed the “biggest tiger” of all corrupt Chinese fugitives and China’s “public enemy number one.” [FN151] Chinese prosecutors claim that Lai, working from the southeastern Chinese port city of Xiamen, was the leader of an operation to smuggle shiploads of oil, rubber, cars, cigarettes, cellular telephones, and other electronic equipment. Lai allegedly paid millions of dollars in bribes so that Chinese navy boats would escort the ships carrying the illicit goods into harbor. [FN152] In the summer of 1999, the Chinese government cracked down on Lai’s smuggling ring. [FN153]

Lai fled to Vancouver, Canada with his family in August 1999. Initially, he was able to live luxuriously in Canada, and he filed an application for political asylum. However, in November 1999, Lai was arrested by Canadian officials for immigration violations. He has been in Canadian legal proceedings ever since. In the meantime, the Chinese government has obtained over eighty convictions, including fourteen death sentences, against individuals who worked with Lai on the alleged scheme; so far, the government has carried out eight of the executions. [FN154] Lai claims that he would certainly face the death penalty like his colleagues if returned to China. [FN155] As the New York Times outlined, the Lai case has created a conundrum for Canada: “Deport him to China for trial on economic charges, an almost certain guarantee that he would be executed? Or grant China’s most-wanted man asylum and unwillingly tell the world that Canada is a sunny place for shady people, a haven for international suspects facing excessive punishment at home?” [FN156]

Indeed, the Lai case has put Canada in a difficult position. Canada has emerged over the last several decades as a world leader in human rights. [FN157] Upon receiving an extradition request, the Canadian executive branch considers the rights of the requested individual, [FN158] and if the executive approves an extradition, the Canadian Supreme Court will consider several factors to determine whether it should intervene to protect individual rights. [FN159] The Canadian public’s strong support for upholding human rights plays a prominent role in these considerations. [FN160] Yet, Canadian businesses have *198 much at stake in the Sino-Canadian relationship, and Canada’s unwillingness to extradite Lai and others to China damages trade and tourism revenue. [FN161] Moreover, “the political relationship between Canada and China is [purportedly] on unusually shaky ground,” [FN162] and the Lai case threatens to further undermine diplomatic relations. [FN163]

Wary of the nation’s growing reputation as a safe haven and the consequences this reputation can have on economic and political relations, the Canadian executive branch reached a deal with China to extradite Lai. [FN164] Immigration authorities have rejected all of Lai’s attempts to gain refugee or asylum status, [FN165] but the Canadian judiciary has characteristically emphasized consciousness for individual rights. After numerous procedural delays, China’s Supreme People’s Court sent diplomatic assurances to the Canadian Federal Court that Lai would not be executed if returned (as the Canadian government demanded). The Chinese claimed that making this promise was “the only correct option to punish crimes and safeguard the interests of the nation.” [FN166] Based on this assurance, a Canadian official approved Lai’s removal order, but a federal court judge overturned this approval on April 5, 2007. The judge ruled that the official’s opinion violated Canadian law because it failed to determine if the assurances on torture were “meaningful and reliable.” According to the ruling, Canada must do more than just accept another country’s promise that it will not execute prisoners; it must prove the reliability of the assurance. [FN167] Pursuant to the ruling, the Canadian Citizenship and Immigration division is now undertaking the lengthy process of repeating its review of the risks Lai faces in China. [FN168] Lai’s proceedings are likely to be drawn out for several more years, illustrating the difficulty for China of achieving an individual extradition with Canada.

*199 In addition to Lai, China reportedly is seeking the extradition of five other individuals from Canada. [FN169] One of the five is Gao Shan, a branch manager with the Bank of China in Harbin who allegedly embezzled one billion yuan (US$130 million). The Canadian judiciary has been consistent in its refusal to extradite these individuals. [FN170] Meanwhile, China’s handling of the case of Huseyin Celil–a Uighur imam of Chinese and Canadian citizenship who was arrested in Uzbekistan, extradited to China against the objections of the Canadian government, and sentenced to life in prison on charges of terrorism–has angered Canada severely and increased tensions between the two nations. [FN171] Canada’s approach to Celil, Lai, Gao, and the other fugitives has escalated criticisms that it is a premier safe haven for the world’s criminals. [FN172] But Canada’s actions have also elicited praise for their leading protection of individual rights. [FN173]

C. Case-by-Case Approach to Extradition with China

In search of middle ground between a treaty-based approach with binding terms and a non-engagement approach, a “case-by-case approach” to extradition with China is characterized by unwillingness to negotiate for an extradition treaty, at least in the near term, but by willingness to return individuals to China on an ad hoc basis. By negotiating for individual extraditions or disguised extraditions on a case-by-case basis, parties have flexibility and can exercise more control over the terms of the extradition and the assurances for treatment of the individual upon return.

The United States currently employs such a case-by-case approach. The United States does not have an extradition treaty with China, [FN174] because (while it cannot criticize the fact that China maintains the death penalty) it is wary of China’s use of the death penalty for nonviolent crimes and its lack of procedural due process in death penalty cases. [FN175] The United States is also critical of China’s poor human rights record in general and is concerned about the overall differences in legal values between mainland China and the United States. [FN176] As Jerome Cohen, a New York University law professor who specializes in the Chinese legal system, points out, “There are important *200 differences in principles and practices that make law-enforcement cooperation between us and the Chinese difficult. I’m in favor of cooperation, but it has to be consistent with our system and values.” [FN177]

Ad hoc, case-by-case extraditions have the potential to attenuate some of the problems associated with Sino-U.S. extradition attempts because the countries would be able to negotiate new terms for each individual extradition. The procedure for responding to extradition requests is for the foreign embassy (in this case the Chinese Embassy in the United States) to make a request to the Department of State, which reviews and forwards the request to the Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. This office assigns an Assistant U.S. Attorney to the case, and he or she obtains a warrant to arrest the fugitive. The arrested fugitive is then brought before a federal magistrate or district court judge for a hearing, during which the judge will determine whether the fugitive is extraditable. [FN178] There is only a very narrow avenue within U.S. law for formally extraditing an individual to a requesting state absent a treaty. In 1996, the U.S. Congress amended federal law to provide for extradition from the United States, even in the absence of a treaty, of foreign nationals who have committed crimes of violence against U.S. nationals outside the United States. [FN179] If the court finds the fugitive to be extraditable to China under this law, it will enter an order of extraditability and certify the record to the Secretary of State, who then must decide whether to surrender the fugitive to the requesting government. The Secretary of State may take human rights or any other considerations into account in making this decision. [FN180]

Because U.S. law limits extradition absent a treaty to this one narrow circumstance, the United States usually refuses to extradite a suspect to China. [FN181] Beyond this narrow window for formal extradition absent a treaty, though, in some circumstances, U.S. immigration laws permit the removal of individuals sought by other countries when extradition by treaty is not available. [FN182] The U.S. government acknowledges that immigration laws can be used to “rid [the] country of dangerous criminal aliens and fugitives from foreign justice in certain circumstances where formal extradition is not *201 available.” [FN183] In response to Chinese requests, the United States has used alternative methods to return criminal suspects to China when extradition was not feasible. [FN184]

The case of Qin Hong is one example of the United States returning a Chinese national to China indirectly. Qin allegedly cheated Shanghai investors out of hundreds of millions of dollars. Chinese authorities had supplied documentary evidence demonstrating that Qin had entered the United States years earlier using a false identity, which made him subject to arrest and deportation under U.S. immigration laws. However, because Qin had been carrying a Panamanian passport at the time of arrest, a U.S. immigration judge removed him to Panama. Then, according to senior officials, the United States informally urged Panama to send Qin back to China, which a Panamanian court did. [FN185]