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[FN82]. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 12.

[FN83]. See U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Annex 1, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/542 (Oct. 23, 1996); Philip P. Pan, U.N. Official Criticizes Education in China, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 2003, at A20.

[FN84]. Each has failed, though. Chronology of Defeats of Anti-China Human Rights Attempts, China.org.cn, Apr. 16, 2004, english/international/93203.htm.

[FN85]. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Report 2005: China (2005), report2005/chn-summary-eng (“There was progress towards reform in some areas, but this failed to have a significant impact on serious and widespread human rights violations perpetrated across the country.”); Human Rights First, Human Rights Defenders in China, defenders/hrd_china/hrd_china.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) (“The human rights situation in China continues to be grave.”).

[FN86]. E.g., Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 71 (2005).

[FN87]. This exodus resulted from a combination of China’s financial growth, which created opportunities for corruption and a subsequent crackdown against corrupt practices. See Zhou, supra note 8.

[FN88]. Ding Zhitao, Fugitive Justice, Beijing Rev., Feb. 9, 2006, available at EN/06-06-e/w-3.htm.

[FN89]. Fu Hualing, supra note 5.

[FN90]. Id.

[FN91]. Chau Pak-kwan & Stephen Lam, Research Study on the Agreement Between Hong Kong and the Mainland Concerning Surrender of Fugitive Offenders P 1.7 (2001), yr00-01/english/library/erp05.pdf.

[FN92]. Id. P 1.14. In China, the most controversial of these principles is the political offense exception. The concept of “political offense” is often not included in the bilateral extradition treaties signed between China and other countries. Qian Hu & Qiang Chen, China’s Extradition Law of 2000, 1 Chinese J. Int’l Law 647, 649-50 (2002).

[FN93]. Ding Zhitao, supra note 88.

[FN94]. Sun Shangwu, supra note 13.

[FN95]. See Ding Zhitao, supra note 88 (“[M]ost Chinese officials flee to Western countries, not vice versa.”).

[FN96]. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

[FN97]. China Working Towards Sustainable Economic Growth, People’s Daily, May 9, 2002, available at 200205/09/eng20020509_95353.shtml; China’s Wen Pledges Fairer Growth, BBC News, Mar. 5, 2007, 2/hi/asia-pacific/6418225.stm.

[FN98]. China Asks Canada to Extradite Former Banker, China.org.cn, Jan. 27, 2007, english/news/197945.htm.

[FN99]. Lague, supra note 9.

[FN100]. Huang Feng, The Establishment and Characteristics of China’s Extradition System, 4 Frontiers L. China 595, 595 (2006). In terms of procedure, China has codified the quasi-judicial, quasi-executive approach. When requesting extradition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs preliminarily examines the documents that China will provide to a foreign country. Then the Supreme People’s Court and authorized High Courts at the provincial level exercise their judicial powers to certify that the requirements set forth by the Extradition Law and extradition treaties are met. But the ultimate power to decide whether the person sought shall be prosecuted in China, and whether conditional extradition shall be granted, is held by the State Council. Extradition Law, supra note 24, art. 29. The law also provides procedures for making requests for extradition to foreign countries. Id. arts. 47-51.

[FN101]. Feng Jianhua, supra note 8.

[FN102]. Id.

[FN103]. Minxin Pei, The Tide of Corruption Threatening China’s Prosperity, Fin. Times, Sept. 27, 2006, at 13.

[FN104]. Zhou, supra note 8.

[FN105]. China Widens Net for Fugitive Fraudsters, China Daily, Apr. 29, 2006, available at china/2006-04/29/content_ 580629.htm.

[FN106]. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

[FN107]. See Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, China and the World Day 2006: Innocence, actioncenter/actions/action7574.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).

[FN108]. Lague, supra note 11 (quoting Steve Vickers, president of the private investigation company International Risk).

[FN109]. Delegation of the Eur. Comm’n to the U.S., EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty, legislat/deathpenalty/deathpenhome.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).

[FN110]. European Commission, The EU’s Human Rights and Democratisation Policy: Abolition of the Death Penalty, comm/external_ relations/human_rights/adp/index.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).

[FN111]. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Penalty Policy by State, firstpage.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).

[FN112]. In 1990, the European Parliament called for a resolution on the abolition of the death penalty in the United States. See William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 535, 558-59 (1998). Later, in December 1997, the European Parliament proposed another resolution, this one aimed at discouraging EU businesses from investing in the United States in an effort to persuade American abolition of the death penalty. Dorean Marguerite Koenig, A Death Penalty Primer: Reviewing International Human Rights Development and the ABA Resolution for a Moratorium on Capital Punishment in Order to Inform Debates in U.S. State Legislatures, 4 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 513, 522 (1998). Europe continues to protest U.S. death penalty practices today. See Harold Hongju Koh & Thomas R. Pickering, American Diplomacy and the Death Penalty, Foreign Service J., Oct. 2003, at 19, 20-21.

[FN113]. Kyle M. Medley, Note, The Widening of the Atlantic: Extradition Practices Between the United States and Europe, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 1213, 1234 (2003).

[FN114]. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 192. For example, see Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Fr., art. 7, Apr. 23, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-13 (1996).

[FN115]. See Lague, supra note 11.

[FN116]. Article 3 of the China-Spain Treaty on Extradition states that an extradition request will be rejected “[w]hen the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the Requesting State, unless the Requesting State provides an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out.” Huang Feng, supra note 100, at 599. See also China-Spain Extradition Treaty, supra note 14.

[FN117]. Press Release, Embassy of the P.R.C. in the U.S., China, Spain Establish Strategic Partnership (Nov. 15, 2005), eng/xw/t221563.htm.

[FN118]. China and Spain Boost Trade Ties, supra note 18.

[FN119]. Press Release, Embassy of the P.R.C. in Austl., China, Spain Agree to Build Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Nov. 16, 2005), eng/xw/t221674.htm.

[FN120]. China Widens Net for Fugitive Fraudsters, supra note 105; Sun Shangwu, supra note 13.

[FN121]. See Huang Feng, supra note 100, at 596; Sun Shangwu, supra note 13.

[FN122]. While China had not previously entered an extradition treaty with a developed Western country, other countries with which China signed treaties between 1993 and 2005 did ask for “non-extradition for death penalty” clauses. Even some countries that continue to use the death penalty domestically prefer to have such a clause in a bilateral extradition agreement. Chau & Lam, supra note 91, P 1.49. Huang Feng, Director of the Research Institute of International Criminal Law at Beijing Normal University, has identified four ways that China previously avoided the direct expression of a “non-extradition for death penalty” provision in extradition treaties:
1) … [t]o persuade the other side not to include such a provision …. 2) to use more general phrases in order to avoid direct expression …. 3) to set the issue aside in the formal provisions of the treaty, but to make explanations in the minutes of the meetings between the parties to the treaty …. and 4) to make a general stipulation in the formal provisions of the treaty, as well as a supplementary explanation in the minutes of meetings.
China used the first option in treaties with Thailand and Kazakhstan, the second option with Russia, the third option with Belarus, and the fourth with Romania and Bulgaria. Chau & Lam, supra note 91, P 1.50.

[FN123]. China and Spain Boost Trade Ties, supra note 18.

[FN124]. China, France Sign Agreement on Extradition, Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 21, 2007, english/2007-03/21/content_ 5874162.htm.

[FN125]. France Backs Extradition to China, BBC News, Mar. 20, 2007, 2/hi/europe/6472679.stm.

[FN126]. According to the article, Chinese diplomatic sources believed that “[t]he treaty provides a legal foundation for China-France cooperation in the fight against crime.” French Justice Minister Pascal Clement said the agreement was of great importance, “particularly for bilateral relations,” and that the agreement would “strengthen and deepen our judicial cooperation further.” China, France Sign Agreement on Extradition, supra note 124.

[FN127]. See Chirac Seeks China Business Ties, BBC News, Oct. 25, 2006, 2/hi/asia-pacific/6083408.stm; France Backs Extradition to China, supra note 125.

[FN128]. France Signs Extradition Treaty with China, supra note 18 (referencing “continuing reports of serious violations in China, including the use of the death penalty and abusive forms of arbitrary detention, torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatments”).

[FN129]. Id.

[FN130]. Martin Arnold, Royal Criticises French Extradition Treaty with China, Fin. Times, Jan. 9, 2007, at 5.

[FN131]. France Signs Extradition Treaty with China, supra note 18.

[FN132]. Kim Willsher, Don’t Mention Human Rights, French Told, Sunday Telegraph (London), Jan. 7, 2007, at 31.

[FN133]. Press Release, Portal do Governo, PM Wants to Showcase “A Modern Portugal” (Jan. 31, 2007), noticias_noticia_ 44.asp.

[FN134]. See Adams, supra note 18; Press Release, Philip Ruddock, supra note 17.

[FN135]. Lague, supra note 11; Liu Li, supra note 20; Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.

[FN136]. Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.

[FN137]. Id.; see also China Hunts Corrupt Officials Who Abscond Overseas, People’s Daily, Mar. 24, 2004, available at 200403/24/eng20040324_138361.shtml (providing Wang’s university affiliation).

[FN138]. Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.

[FN139]. Id. (describing Chen Zhonglin’s, Xie Wangyuan’s, and Liu Tingji’s stances against abolition).

[FN140]. Jeremy T. Monthy, Comment, Internal Perspectives on Chinese Human Rights Reform: The Death Penalty in the PRC, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 189, 208 (1998).

[FN141]. Lu Jianping & Guo Jian, Death Penalty in People’s Republic of China: Quo Vadis?, 2006 Electronic Rev. Int’l Ass’n Penal L. A4, at 1-2, pdf/ReAIDP2006/DeathpenaltyChinaLU.pdf.

[FN142]. Lague, supra note 11.

[FN143]. Id.

[FN144]. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Can.-P.R.C., July 29, 1994, 33 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 411 (1995). The mutual legal assistance treaty provides for cooperation in gathering and exchanging information to enforce criminal laws.

[FN145]. See Comment, Canadian Court Doesn’t Buy into Lai’s Lies, China Daily, Feb. 9, 2004, available at english/doc/2004-02/09/content_304375.htm; Maggie Farley, Alleged Boss of China Smuggling Ring Presents Canada with a Conundrum Law, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 2000, at A6; Yang, supra note 21, at 4.

[FN146]. Extradition Act, 1999 S.C. ch. 18, § 10(1) (Can.) (“The Minister of Foreign Affairs may, with the agreement of the Minister, enter into a specific agreement with a State or entity for the purpose of giving effect to a request for extradition in a particular case.”); Extradition Law, supra note 24, art. 15, (“Where there is no extradition treaty to go by, the Requesting State shall make a reciprocity assurance.”).

[FN147]. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

[FN148]. .See York, supra note 22. Li Juqian, associate professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, said that when there is no treaty, “‘only diplomatic means can be counted on. If ties between the two countries are not close enough, the procedure can drag out.”’ Ding Zhitao, supra note 88.

[FN149]. James Brooke, Canada’s Haven: For Notorious Fugitives, Too?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2000, at A14.

[FN150]. See Douglas Stewart, The Brutal Seas: Organized Crime at Work 246-47 (2006); Brooke, supra note 149; Farley, supra note 145. Except for the case of Yang, prior to 2007 China and Canada had never reached an agreement to extradite a suspected economic criminal. See Will Gao Shan Be the First Chinese Fugitive Extradited by Canada?, Chinese in Vancouver Blog, (Feb. 28, 2007), 2007/02/will-gao-shan-be-first-chinese.html (referencing statement of David Matas, lawyer of Lai Changxing, in a recent hearing).

[FN151]. Stewart, supra note 150; Brooke, supra note 149 [James Brooke, Canada's Haven: For Notorious Fugitives, Too?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2000, at A14.]; Farley, supra note 145.

[FN152]. Farley, supra note 145.

[FN153]. Id.

[FN154]. Doug Struck, Canada’s Extradition Laws Help Make Vancouver a Grifter’s Haven, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 2007, at A15.

[FN155]. Stewart, supra note 150 (“Lai’s fears that he will face the death penalty are justified.”).

[FN156]. Brooke, supra note 149.

[FN157]. See Koren L. Bell, Note, From Laggard to Leader: Canadian Lessons on a Role for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Human Rights Treaties, 5 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 255 (2002).